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Abstract
Due to economic and demographic changes highly educated women are increasingly important for the Chinese labour
market. Gender is a well-studied determinant of behaviour in economic experiments, as are similarly academic major,
age and income. We study determinants of trust and reciprocity for Chinese subjects in a labour market experiment
using two variants of a gift exchange framework with employers and workers. We find that women are significantly
less trusting and less reciprocal in one game variant while this relationship is only clear for reciprocity in the other
variant.
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1. Introduction
Economic growth together with the one child policy are changing the labour market in China with growing
demand for skilled labour, increasing the importance of women in the labour force (Zhang et al., 2012).
Furthermore, more educated women are entering the labour force, as education of children does not focus on
boys any more – parental investments go to one child independent of its gender, while traditionally parents
invested primarily in males. Understanding the role of gender on the market for skilled labour in China is
hence increasingly important.
Many economic experiments have investigated gender differences in labour market decisions. Croson
and Gneezy (2009) provide a comprehensive survey. However, most experiments were conducted in Western
countries and less is known about applicability to China. As gender differences are based on genetic but
also cultural factors, it is necessary to study them within culture. Furthermore, Song et al. (2012) argue
that trust and reciprocity, which matter in labour relations, may be different in China due to guanxi (the
importance of social connections). In this paper we use Chinese subjects, focussing on trust, reciprocity and
risk-taking in an experimental labour market. We add to existing research that addresses gender differences
in trust and reciprocity in China indicating that females are less trusting and potentially less reciprocal
(Wang and Yamagishi, 2005; Song et al., 2012; Shen and Qin, 2014).
We find that women are less trusting. Lower willingness to create social benefit and be reciprocal,
rather than risk attitudes, drives this result, although both may have a joint effect. We also investigate
other individual characteristics (age, academic major, employment status and income), connecting existing
research on these variables to our results from China.
2. Literature and hypothesis
Gender is probably the best studied determinant of decisions in economic experiments. Eckel and Grossman
(2008) and Croson and Gneezy (2009) summarise experimental evidence on gender differences in behaviour
that involves risk attitudes and social preferences. They conclude that differences between decisions of men
and women are observable in some cases while not in others. The picture is particularly mixed for social
preferences, with no or vanishing differences based on gender, showing tendencies of lower trust and higher
reciprocation by women. Croson and Gneezy (2009) also describe that women are often more risk averse
than men. Due to these mixed results research on gender differences continues (see e.g. the special issue of
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organisation 83(1) in 2012).
Also other determinants of experimental decisions have been studied, although not as extensively as
gender. Age has been related to risk attitudes (e.g. Harbaugh et al., 2002) and social preferences (e.g.
Martinsson et al., 2011; Sutter and Kocher, 2007; Charness and Villeval, 2009). Pro-social behaviour increases
with age, but changes are gradual with differences between cohorts or generations. Also academic major
has been linked to pro-social behaviour. Marwell and Ames (1981) observed that economists are often more
selfish and their results have been confirmed by further studies (Carter and Irons, 1991; Frank et al., 1993;
Dasgupta and Menon, 2011). We study gender but include academic major and age as controls. We also
consider other variables which may be important for experimental decisions and discuss these below.
We hypothesise similar effects of gender and other demographic controls in our experiment. However,
decision patterns of students in China may differ from those found elsewhere. Bu and McKeen (2001) provide
evidence that social behaviour may be different in China, especially in working environments. Wang and
Yamagishi (2005) find that Chinese women are less trusting when engaging in social relationships requiring
reciprocal counterparts. Also Shen and Qin (2014) find that women are less trusting in experiments across
4 regions in China, but find no significant differences in trustworthiness. We therefore hypothesise women
to be less trusting than men, while recognising that gender differences might be context-dependent.
3. Experimental design
We used the gift exchange game (GEG, as introduced by Fehr et al., 1993) and the wage promising game
(WPG, a GEG variant introduced in Dulleck et al., 2012). In both games participants are employers or
workers. The employer first makes a wage offer (WO=[5,10,. . . ,100]) to the worker who can accept or reject
it. If the worker rejects, the game ends and both employer and worker receive 60 experimental dollars. If
the worker accepts, he has to choose an effort (E=[1,2,. . . ,10]). In the GEG the game ends at this point
and both players get paid based on the payoff function (see below). In the WPG the employer observes
the effort and determines the final wage (FW=[5,10,. . . ,100]), which does not depend on the wage offer
made previously. In both games the payoff functions are piEmployer=50–wage+20·E and piWorker=50+wage–
(6+4·E) experimental dollars, whereas the wage is the WO in the GEG and the FW in the WPG.
The games allow us to study trust and reciprocity. These games were used instead of the more general
trust game (Berg et al., 1995), as the GEG and WPG with the framing used here are more tailored to study
labour market trust, which was the main interest of this study. In the GEG employers make high wage offers
if they trust workers to return high effort and workers return high effort if they are reciprocal. In the WPG
wage offers are non-binding; high efforts will only be chosen by workers who trust in employers to return
high final wages; and final wages in reaction to effort imply that employers are reciprocal. If also wage offers
play a significant role for final wages in the WPG, they are not pure cheap talk. Using the two games allows
to observe what drives trust: Pro-social attitudes or expected reciprocation, as uncertainty about binding
counterpart decisions is present for employers in the GEG, but not in the WPG, and for workers vice versa.
Hence, comparing between the games allows to understand if risk or reciprocation explain behaviour.
The experiment was implemented in a computer laboratory using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) with 216
volunteer students (60% male, average age 20.63, 112 economics-related and 104 engineering-related stu-
dents) at Southeast University in Nanjing in November 2010.1 A labour market framing described the roles
as employers and workers, and decisions as wage offers, efforts and final wages. Participants were randomly
assigned the role of workers or employers at the beginning and remained in this role throughout the experi-
ment. The experiment included 8 rounds of the GEG and 8 rounds of the WPG; the order of which game
was played first was randomly changed between sessions to control for order effects. Participants received
instructions for each game before the first round of each game (i.e., before rounds 1 and 9, respectively).
Employer-worker pairs were rematched each round. 2 rounds of each game were randomly chosen for payment
and experimental dollars were transformed to Chinese Yuan at a rate of 50:1 as announced at the beginning
of the experiment; participants earned between 3 and 12 (on average around 8) Yuan for about one hour
of participation. This compares to 7 to 8 Yuan paid per hour of student work opportunities on campus at
the time of the experiment. The experiment was followed by a short experimental questionnaire, asking for
gender, age, and other demographic information, job market experience, job attitudes, origin within China,
income and expenditures, and trusting attitudes.
4. Experimental results
Participants played as employers or workers and in two different games, the GEG and the WPG. Decisions
therefore depend on the role and the game. Wage offers, efforts and realised wages are significantly different
between the games and therefore analysed separately.2 We scrutinised results for game order effects (which we
did not find) and further controls. We include controls if they were significant in any specification or if results
in the literature indicated a potential relationship. Further robustness checks were made on the functional
specification of the analysis (Tobit models instead of OLS).3 We did not find any qualitative changes based on
alternative specifications and report OLS results in the following. Regressions used standard errors clustered
by individual (results are the same when clustering by session).
1Participants interacted in sessions with others that had similar majors than themselves but were not informed about this
or other characteristics of their counterpart.
2Differences in wage offers and realised wages in the GEG come from the possibility of workers to decline wage offers.
3Structured models may reflect complex game dynamics, such as the rejection of offers.
Table 1: Determinants of decisions
Wage offer Wage offer Final wage Final wage Effort Effort
(GEG) (WPG) (WPG) (WPG) (GEG) (WPG)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female -15.690** -4.418 -10.374* -8.754 -0.702** -0.593
(6.374) (4.843) (5.834) (5.509) (0.345) (0.514)
Econ. student -4.753 6.525 -4.604 -2.502 -0.511 0.154
(6.640) (5.365) (6.436) (5.766) (0.381) (0.502)
Age -4.877** -4.991** -0.491 0.785 -0.010 -0.070
(2.155) (2.082) (2.260) (1.998) (0.123) (0.168)
Currently employed 17.885*** 0.726 12.412* 13.093*** -0.340 -0.625
(5.682) (4.427) (6.392) (4.629) (0.769) (0.627)
Income 0.008** -0.002 0.004 0.003 -0.000 -0.002**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
Period -1.600*** 2.619*** 0.602 -0.333 0.103*** -0.148***
(0.554) (0.404) (0.473) (0.535) (0.032) (0.046)
Wage offer -0.035 0.072*** 0.070***
(0.098) (0.004) (0.005)
Effort 6.846***
(0.653)
N 784 784 614 614 792 792
R2 0.16 0.12 0.05 0.32 0.60 0.28
OLS regressions of employer (1)-(4) and worker (5)-(6) decisions. *** indicates significance at the
1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level; standard errors are clustered by individual.
We start with describing employer decisions. Specifications (1)–(4) of Table 1 show determinants of
binding wage offers in the GEG, non-binding wage offers in the WPG and final wages in the WPG. Potential
determinants are gender, academic major, age, employment status, income and a time control (Period, to
reflect developments over time). Our variable of interest is gender. Females are less trusting in the GEG,
making significantly less generous wage offers to workers. Wage offers are lower by 27 percent ( 16
57
, given
the average wage offer of 57), an economically large difference. Female employers are hence less trusting.
Comparing employer decisions across games indicates that risk attitudes might drive lower trust, as females’
lower level of wage offers is mediated once the risky element is removed in the WPG and the wage can be
determined after observing effort. Furthermore, females pay marginally lower wages in the WPG; however,
the effect is not entirely robust as it becomes insignificant when controlling for efforts received.4
We also investigate other variables. There is no significant effect of academic major on decisions. Older
employers are significantly less trusting in both games. Final wage decisions of the WPG are however
not influenced by age. As age differences in our sample reflect relative age within a cohort, there is no
straightforward interpretation and we refrain from speculation. Current employment has a significantly
positive effect on binding wages, both for wage offers in the GEG and final wages in the WPG, but not
for wage offers in the WPG. This indicates that job experience increases trust and reciprocity. We also
control for income, which has a significantly positive effect on wage offers in the GEG, but not on other
employer decisions. The size of the income coefficient (0.008) is noticeable (the standard deviation is 506).
As parental transfers are the major source of income for most participants, this indicates that participants
from higher-income families trust more. Wage offers decline over time in the GEG although it would be
4Insignificantly lower wage offers lead to lower efforts and insignificantly lower reciprocity to efforts jointly lead to lower
final wages by females. Furthermore, when using a random-effects model for final wages corresponding to specifications (3)
and (4) in order to account for individual heterogeneity, females pay significantly less in both cases. This supports the general
notion that final wages by females are lower (though the gender effect is smaller than in the random-effects correspondent of
specification (1)).
profitable for employers to increase their wage offers.5 On the contrary, in the WPG wage offers increase
over time, hence employers increasingly use (costless) wage offers to increase worker effort. For final wages
in the WPG no time trend is observable. For this decision specification (4) describes two other factors, wage
offers and received efforts, due to their potential importance. Wage offers were used as cheap talk, having
no influence on final wages. However, employers positively reciprocate efforts and pay more than workers’
extra cost of effort.6
We then analysed worker decisions. Columns (5) and (6) of Table 1 show potential determinants of
efforts. Workers respond positively to wage offers and react to them in almost the same way in both games,
although in the GEG wage offers are binding while they are not in the WPG. We considered the same
determinants for workers as for employers. Females are less reciprocal in the GEG, while the difference is
insignificant in the WPG.7 This result indicates that female workers are significantly less reciprocal, but
not significantly less trusting, which differs to findings for employers. We also investigate other potential
determinants. There is no significant difference for academic major, age and employment status. Higher
income is related to less trust in the WPG, while there is no significant difference in the GEG, the first of
which is contrary to the finding in the analysis of employer choices. These results weaken the effects of other
covariates observed for employer decisions, hence the role taken in the experiment may influence what drives
trust and reciprocity. Finally, there is again a significant time trend. Workers are increasingly reciprocal in
the GEG and decreasingly trusting in the WPG, which is consistent with time trends for employers.
Overall, and in line with the literature, we observe trust and reciprocity for both games and roles. We
find significant gender differences in the GEG and a more mixed picture in the WPG. Our results suggest
that females are both less trusting and less reciprocal: Comparisons across games for employers indicate that
females are less trusting due to both risk attitudes and reciprocity: Gender differences in wage offers become
smaller and insignificant when the risky element is removed, which highlights the role of risk attitudes.
However, there is also some indication that females pay lower final wages in the WPG, which is due to
gender differences in reciprocity. The importance of risk attitudes is, however, not further supported when
looking at effort decisions, as introducing uncertainty for workers in the WPG does not increase gender
differences. Also across the different decision variables gender differences are much less pronounced (mostly
insignificant) in the WPG, indicating that the introduction of wage promises makes decisions of males and
females more similar. Nevertheless, even in the WPG lower reciprocity of female employers (showing in
overall lower final wages by employers) prevails. This result regarding gender differences in reciprocity is
supported when looking at worker decisions. Female workers are less reciprocal, as they return significantly
less in the GEG, but do not provide significantly different efforts when facing uncertainty in the WPG.
This leaves a mixed picture, in which risk attitudes and reciprocity have a joint influence, and with lower
reciprocity being a potentially greater driver of gender differences. Furthermore, the results indicate that
the gender effect of risk attitudes and reciprocity may be influenced by the role taken in the experiment.
While explaining this difference is speculative only with our data, our findings are in line with the general
picture in the literature that women are more reactive to game-context and framing.
5. Conclusion
We find that some but not all findings of the experimental economic literature on gender differences are also
visible in our Chinese sample. Females are less trusting than males in GEG decisions, with its direction and
context-dependence being similar to findings in the West (Croson and Gneezy, 2009) and elsewhere in China
(Wang and Yamagishi, 2005; Shen and Qin, 2014). However, we find only partial support that this lower
trust is primarily driven by risk aversion. Rather reciprocity drives a good part of our results, as in both
games females transfer less to their counterparts when making the last decision in a game.
5Increasing the wage offer by one unit (5) has an effect of ∆piEmployer = -5+0.07·5·20 = 2.2 given the coefficient of wage
offers on effort (0.07) by workers (see columns (5) and (6) of Table 1).
6One extra unit of effort costs workers 4, but is reciprocated with 6.8 experimental dollars by employers.
7The effect is driven by the reaction of females to wage offers if using an interaction term together with the dummy variable
for females or instead of the dummy variable.
Our results provide important insights about determinants of (labour market relevant) preferences in
China. Understanding gender differences in labour relations is crucial, as China continues to grow, while
its demographic structure is changing and likely to increasingly draw on an educated female workforce.
Knowing about the behaviour of this workforce is therefore important. This paper is one step towards
a better knowledge. For example, our results indicate that using more informal labour market relations
may generally lead to more gift exchange and hence higher productivity. However, they also indicate that
work environments in which gift exchange between employers and workers is central function less well with
a predominantly female workforce, though gender differences are partly mediated when allowing for non-
binding wage offers. This may require revised management styles for Western firms expanding to China
and is informative for Chinese policy makers who consider to create labour markets in which (informal) gift
exchange is substituted by more formal interaction.
References
Berg, J., J. Dickhaut and K. McCabe (1995) “Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History.” Games and Economic
Behavior 10(1), 122–142.
Bu, N. and C. A. McKeen (2001) “Work goals among male and female business students in Canada and
China: The effects of culture and gender.” International Journal of Human Resource Management 12(2),
166–183.
Carter, J. R. and M. D. Irons (1991) “Are economists different, and if so, why?” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 171–177.
Charness, G. and M. C. Villeval (2009) “Cooperation and Competition in Intergenerational Experiments in
the Field and the Laboratory.” American Economic Review 99(3), 956–978.
Croson, R. and U. Gneezy (2009) “Gender differences in preferences.” Journal of Economic Literature 47(2),
448–474.
Dasgupta, U. and A. Menon (2011) “Trust and trustworthiness among economics majors.” Economics
Bulletin 31(4), 2799–2815.
Dulleck, U., J. Fooken and Y. He (2012) “Public Policy and Individual Labor Market Discrimination: An
Artefactual Field Experiment in China.” QuBE Working Paper Series .
Eckel, C. C. and P. J. Grossman (2008) “Differences in the economic decisions of men and women: Experi-
mental evidence.” Handbook of experimental economics results 1, 509–519.
Fehr, E., G. Kirchsteiger and A. Riedl (1993) “Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental
Investigation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(2), 437–459.
Fischbacher, U. (2007) “z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments.” Experimental Eco-
nomics 10(2), 171–178.
Frank, R. H., T. Gilovich and D. T. Regan (1993) “Does studying economics inhibit cooperation?” Journal
of Economic Perspectives 159–171.
Harbaugh, W. T., K. Krause and L. Vesterlund (2002) “Risk attitudes of children and adults: Choices over
small and large probability gains and losses.” Experimental Economics 5(1), 53–84.
Martinsson, P., K. Nordblom, D. Ru¨tzler and M. Sutter (2011) “Social preferences during childhood and the
role of gender and age – An experiment in austria and sweden.” Economics Letters 110(3), 248–251.
Marwell, G. and R. E. Ames (1981) “Economists free ride, does anyone else? experiments on the provision
of public goods.” Journal of Public Economics 15(3), 295–310.
Shen, J. and X. Qin (2014) “Cooperation, Trust and Economic Development: An Experimental Study in
China.” Pacific Economic Review 19(4), 423–438.
Song, F., C. B. Cadsby and Y. Bi (2012) “Trust, reciprocity, and guanxi in China: An experimental inves-
tigation.” Management and Organization Review 8(2), 397–421.
Sutter, M. and M. G. Kocher (2007) “Trust and trustworthiness across different age groups.” Games and
Economic Behavior 59(2), 364–382.
Wang, F. and T. Yamagishi (2005) “Group-based trust and gender differences in china.” Asian Journal of
Social Psychology 8(2), 199–210.
Zhang, J., X. Pang, L. Zhang, A. Medina and S. Rozelle (2012) “Gender Inequality in Education in China:
A Meta–Regression Analysis.” Working Paper - Rural Education Action Project .
